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RECENT DECISION
New York's "Minor" Obscenity
Statute Held Constitutional
A seventeen year old youth, following
a prearranged plan, purchased two
"girlie" magazines from the defendant, a
cigar store proprietor, who was then ar-
rested for violating Section 484-i of the
New York Penal Law which prohibits
the sale or delivery of pornographic
material to minors under the age of
eighteen. In affirming his conviction, the
Court of Appeals held that, although
scienter as to age was not an element of
the violation, the statute was neither a
limitation on the first amendment free-
doms of speech and press nor unconsti-
tutionally vague. People v. Tannenbaum,
18 N.Y.2d 268, 220 N.E.2d 783, 274
N.Y.S.2d 131 (1966).
The first amendment provides that
"Congress shall make no law . . .
abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press. . . .., 1 This does not mean,
however, that a citizen has an absolute
right to speak or publish whatever he
deems fit.2  When the expression of a
1 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666
(1925).
person is adversely prejudicial to the
public welfare, federal and state govern-
ments have the power to prohibit such
expression .3
In Roth v. United States,4 the United
States Supreme Court declared that
"obscenity" is not within the area pro-
tected by the constitutional guarantees of
free speech or press.5 The Court stated
that in determining obscenity the test was
"whether to the average person, applying
contemporary community standards, the
dominant theme of the material taken as
a whole appeals to prurient interest." 6
The term "contemporary community
standards" has been construed to mean
not the standards of the particular local
3 Id. at 667. In Gitlow, writings which ad-
vocated, advised and taught the overthrowing
and overturning of organized government by
force, violence and unlawful means were found
to be inimical to the public welfare. In Fox
v. Washington, 236 U.S. 273 (1915), it was
held that the wilful printing and circulation of
material advocating or encouraging the com-
mission of a crime or the breach of the peace
to be adversely prejudicial to the public wel-
fare. See also Patterson v. Colorado, 205
U.S. 454 (1907).
4354 U.S. 476 (1957).
5 ld. at 485.
61d. at 489.
community from which the case arises,
but those of the nation as a whole.7 The
Roth test has been qualified in that the
material must also be "patently offen-
sive. ' 8 This means that the material
must be so offensive on its face, "as to
affront community standards of de-
cency." 9
Aside from the material's "appeal to
prurient interest," another element of the
test-implied in Roth and specifically
stated in Memoirs v. Massachusetts 10 _
is that the material must also be "utterly
without redeeming social importance," 11
i.e., the material must be lewd for the
sake of being lewd, offensive for the sake
of being offensive.
A further refinement of the concept of
prurient interest was made in Mishkin v.
New York. 12 Mr. Justice Brennan, speak-
ing for the Court, adopted the position
that the prurient appeal requirement is
satisfied if the dominant theme of the
material appeals to the prurient interest
of a clearly defined deviant sexual group
where such material is designed for and
primarily distributed to that group.13
Ginzburg v. United States,1 4 a companion
case to Mishkin, added that, in close
cases,
where an exploitation of interests in
titillation by pornography is shown with
respect to material lending itself to such
exploitation through pervasive treatment or
7 Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964).
8 Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S.
478 (1962).
9Id. at 482.
10 383 U.S. 413 (1966).
11Id. at 418.
12 383 U.S. 502 (1966).
1"Id. at 508.
14 383 U.S. 463 (1966).
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description of sexual matters, such
evidence may support the determination
that the material is obscene even though
in other contexts the material would escape
such condemnation. 15
Thus the element of "pandering" was intro-
duced, whereby consideration was given
to the business of disseminating materials
advertised to appeal to erotic interests.
It is important to note that, although a
state cannot define obscenity in terms
broader than those laid down by the
United States Supreme Court, a state,
of its own accord, may apply a definition
of obscenity narrower than that expressed
by the Court; it may voluntarily limit the
ambit of its control. Thus, New York,
in applying its statute controlling the
dissemination of obscene material to
adults, has defined obscenity as "hard-
core pornography." 16
When the federal or state government
seeks to enact laws restricting freedom
of expression, the power of said govern-
ments to do so is limited by the due pro-
cess clauses of the fifth and fourteenth
amendments, i.e., the standards embodied
in the legislation may not be unduly vague
or difficult of ascertainment. Thus, in
Winters v. New York, 17 the United States
Supreme Court held a New York ob-
scenity statute "I unconstitutional on these
grounds. This statute's prohibition was
not limited to the indecent and obscene,
but, in addition, prohibited the publica-
tion of detective stories, criminal treatises
and stories of deeds of bloodshed when
15id. at 475-76.
16 Mishkin v. New York, supra note 12, at
506, 508.
17333 U.S. 507 (1948).
18 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1941, ch. 925, § 1(2).
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so massed as to incite a person to violent
and depraved crimes even though such
a result was not intended by the pub-
lisher.19
Turning from the general constitutional
limitations applicable to any statutory
regulation, a limitation unique to ob-
scenity regulations is the requirement of
scienter of content. In Smith v. Cali-
fornia,20 the Supreme Court declared un-
constitutional a California ordinance
imposing criminal liability on any person
who had in his possession any obscene
or indecent publication in a place of
business where books are kept or sold.
The fundamental defect in the ordinance
was the lack of any requirement as to
knowledge on the part of the bookseller
of the book's contents. This operated, in
effect, to place strict liability upon the
bookseller and would have forced him to
restrict the books he sold to those he
inspected, resulting in a restriction not
only upon obscene matter, but also upon
the distribution of material constitutionally
protected.2
The broad standards which the Supreme
Court has laid down as regards obscenity
have caused state governments much con-
cern in the area of regulation of dissem-
ination of material not obscene as to
adults, but unfit for minors. It has been
recognized that the authority of the state
over the activity of children is broader
than that over similar adult conduct.22
In an attempt to exercise its authority
19Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 519
(1948).
20361 U.S. 147 (1959).
21 d. at 153-54.
22 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158
(1944).
over the activity of children, New York
enacted former Section 484-h of the New
York Penal Law.2 3 In People v. Book-
case, Inc.,24 appellants had been convicted
of violating former section 484-h. In
reversing the conviction, the Court of
Appeals held that that part of the statute
which read "any book . . . the cover or
content of which exploits, is devoted to,
or is principally made up of descriptions
of illicit sex or sexual immorality .. " 2
was so broad and obscure as to violate the
First Amendment to the United States
Constitution, and the due process clause
of the New York constitution.' The
fact that the statute was applicable only
to minors had no bearing on the consti-
tutional issue. The Court maintained
that, if the statute were to be given effect,
great works of literature would be deemed
illicit reading for the young, since anything
dealing with sex would come under the
prohibition of this statute regardless of
whether the material was fictional,
sociological or morally instructive in
nature.
Similarly, in People v. Kahan,7 the
Court found the entire statute unconstitu-
tional due to the vagueness of its sub-
stantive definitions. In addition, the
Court believed the statute defective in
that it lacked a provision making scienter
of the content and of the age of the pur-
chaser essential for conviction. Judge
2 3 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1955, ch. 836, § 542.
24 14 N.Y.2d 409, 201 N.E.2d 14, 252 N.Y.S.2d
433 (1964).
25 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1955, ch. 836, § 542.
26 N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 6: "No person shall
be deprived of life, liberty or property without
due process of law."
27 15 N.Y.2d 311, 206 N.E.2d 333, 258 N.Y.S.2d
391 (1965) (per curiam).
Fuld, concurring, felt this type of regula-
tion to be a constitutional exercise of the
state's authority. He reasoned that,
although parental supervision of a child's
reading may be best, such parental con-
trol or guidance cannot always be pro-
vided, and society's transcendent interest
in protecting the welfare of children per-
mits that such authority be exercised .2
Judge Fuld added, however, that the
definition of obscenity in such a statute
should be "reasonably precise so that
those who are governed by the law and
those that administer it will understand
its meaning and application." 29
As a result of former Section 484-h
of the New York Penal Law being held
unconstitutional, the New York legis-
lature enacted two new sections-present
section 484-h, applicable to minors under
seventeen, and section 484-i, applicable
to minors under eighteen.
In Bookcase, Inc. v. Broderick,30 the
New York Court of Appeals, in review-
ing present section 484-h, held that a state
may constitutionally enact legislation
which differentiates the standards of
obscenity as to adults and minors.
The Court pointed out that when the
law is applied, a three-element definition
of what is "harmful to minors" is to be
used. First, the material must pre-
dominantly appeal to the prurient, shame-
ful or morbid interest of minors; second,
it must be patently offensive to prevail-
ing standards of what is suitable for
28 Id. at 312, 206 N.E.2d at 334, 258 N.Y.S.2d
at 392 (concurring opinion).
291d. at 313, 206 N.E.2d at 335, 258 N.Y.S.2d
at 393.
30 18 N.Y.2d 71, 218 N.E.2d 668, 271 N.Y.S.2d
947 (1966).
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minors; third, it must be utterly without
redeeming social importance.
In the principal case, the defendant
sold a seventeen year old a magazine en-
titled "Candid." The cover of the mag-
azine exhibited a picture of a seductively
posed girl clad only in skimpy under-
garments. In addition to the pictorial
representation, the cover described the
contents, each article having a provoca-
tive title. The lower left hand comer
stated: "Sale to Minors Forbidden." The
magazine was devoted purely to sex,
featuring tales of sex orgies and pictures
of nudes. The advertisements contained
therein promoted mail-order photographs
and motion pictures of nudes, sexual de-
vices and handbooks. In a prosecution
under 484-i, 484-h not being in issue
under the particular facts of the case,
the Court of Appeals concluded that the
magazine came within the restrictions im-
posed by the new section of the penal
law, which prohibits the sale of such
material to a person under the age
of eighteen, the vendor having knowledge
of its contents.3 1  Having so decided,
the Court turned its attention to the de-
fendant's constitutional attacks upon the
statute.
Initially, it was contended that section
484-i is so vague that conviction under
the statute would deprive defendant of
due process of law. In rejecting this con-
tention, the Court found that the material
subject to restriction is clearly defined.
Judge Keating, speaking for the ma-
jority, indicated that the obscenity stan-
31 People v. Tannenbaum, 18 N.Y.2d 268, 271,
220 N.E.2d 783, 785, 274 N.Y.S.2d 131, 134
(1966).
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dard under the various subdivisions pro-
scribed material which was
'posed or presented in such a manner as
to exploit lust for commercial gain and
. . . which would appeal to the lust of
persons under the age of eighteen years
or to their curiosity as to sex or to the
anatomical differences between the
sexes . ... 32
In analyzing this standard it was point-
ed out that a conviction under the statute
would not be based merely on the dis-
semination of material which appeals to
the minor's curiosity as to sex or to the
anatomical differences between the sexes.
In interpreting the language of the statute,
the provision was found to be primarily
aimed at pandering. Hence, in addition
to arousing the minor's curiosity, pro-
hibited material must be posed or pre-
sented in such a manner as to exploit
lust for commercial gain. On the basis
of this construction of 484-i, it was felt
that the statute did not "spill over into
the area of constitutionally protected mat-
ter." 33
In further support of its construction,
the Court noted that the statute expressly
provided that obscenity is to be dis-
tinguished from "flat and factual state-
ments of the facts, causes, functions or
purposes of the subject of the writing or
presentation, such as would be found in
bona fide medical or biological text-
books." 34 The purpose of such material
not being the exploitation of lust for com-
mercial gain, the Court felt confident that
legitimate works of art, educational texts
32 Id. at 271, 220 N.E.2d at 786, 274 N.Y.S.2d
at 135. (Emphasis added.)
33 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
and literature with redeeming social value
were not within the ban of section 484-i.
Countering appellant's contention that the
term "obscene" was indefinite and vague,
the Court held that the statute provided
a workable standard insofar as it gave
clear and unequivocal warning of the
conduct to be avoided, i.e., pandering. 5
A second constitutional objection raised
by the defendant was based upon an ex-
tension of the first amendment protection
of free speech and press. Relying on the
reasoning of Smith v. California, it was
contended that the failure to require proof
of scienter on behalf of the bookseller as
to the age of the purchaser would tend
to restrict the bookseller in the material
he would sell to persons whose mem-
bership in the eighteen and over age
bracket was questionable, and would, in
effect, be a state imposed restraint on
the sale of constitutionally protected liter-
ature. While recognizing that scienter of
content is a constitutional requirement of
any obscenity statute, the Court refused
to accede to the defendant's argument
that the rationale underlying the scienter
of content requirement in Smith v. Cal-
ifornia mandated a constitutional require-
ment of scienter as to age. 6
In so deciding, the Court distinguished
the situation presented in Smith from the
present case, finding a major difference
between
requiring the bookseller to read every
piece of material which he chooses to sell
and requiring him to inquire after and
35 Id. at 272-73, 220 N.E.2d at 787, 274 N.Y.S.
2d at 135-36.
36 Id. at 273, 220 N.E.2d at 787, 274 N.Y.S.2d
at 137.
establish the age of those persons who
will fall within the doubtful age bracketY
The number of situations in which inquiry
would be necessary were considered to be
few in comparison to the total number of
purchasers.
The Court noted that the protections
granted by the first amendment are not
absolute, and, therefore, Section 484-i of
the Penal Law was to be viewed in light
of its "reasonableness in relation to the
legitimate end to be obtained." 38 Adopt-
ing such an approach, the Court found
that the imposition of strict liability as
to age did not cause the statute to un-
duly inhibit the free dissemination of
literature.
Judge Fuld, dissenting, believed that
the legislature could constitutionally re-
strict the distribution of certain materials
to minors, the distribution of which could
not be restricted as to adults, but thought
that a conviction could not be sustained
under Section 484-i of the Penal Law.39
37 Id. at 274, 220 N.E.2d at 788, 274 N.Y.S.2d
at 137.
38 Id. at 275, 220 N.E.2d at 788, 274 N.Y.S.2d
at 138. See Fagan, Obscenity Control and
Minors-The Case for a Separate Standard,
10 CATHOLIc LAW. 270, 278 (1964), wherein
the author states:
The evidence of causal relationship be-
tween constant exposure of children to
obscene materials and moral degeneracy
and juvenile delinquency, even though
conflicting, can certainly justify a legis-
lative decision to act in this area despite
the fact that it results in some curtail-
ment of adult freedom of press.
39 t must be noted that while Judge Fuld dis-
sented, he voted for the reversal of conviction
"with some reluctance." 18 N.Y.2d at 275, 220
N.E.2d at 788, 274 N.Y.S.2d at 138 (dissenting
opinion).
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Judge Fuld considered the statute uncon-
stitutional in that it was defective with
regard to its "substantive definition" and
its failure to require scienter as to age.
Inasmuch as section 484-i proscribes
the sale of material which appeals to the
curiosity of minors "as to sex or to the
anatomical differences between the sexes,"
minors being those "actually or appar-
ently under the age of eighteen years,"
it was thought that such standards in
and of themselves were patently insuf-
ficient and impermissible predicates for
penal liability. Apart from the fact that
such standards would cover both mar-
ried teenagers and children of tender
years, the statute was considered as in-
discriminately punishing the dissemina-
tion of material which evoked a healthy
curiosity about sex. Taken literally, and
without the pandering provision, Judge
Fuld believed that the statute would out-
law instructive courses, such as sex and
hygiene education, and would bar a minor
from access to the paintings of the great
masters.
With regard to the pandering "limita-
tion" of the statute, the dissent considered
the added requirement that the material
be "presented in such a manner as to
exploit lust for commercial gain," to be
of no saving value. Even if this was a
limitation, the statute was still too broad.
Relying upon the recent decision of the
Supreme Court in Ginzburg, the dissent
pointed out that the intent of the seller,
or his presentation, "does not deprive pub-
lications or other works which are not
questionable of their constitutional pro-
tection." 40 It was further noted that the
401 d. at 276, 220 N.E.2d at 789, 274 N.Y.S.2d
at 139 (dissenting opinion).
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phrase "presented in such manner as to
exploit lust for commercial gain" was the
exact phrase which the Court held un-
constitutionally vague in People v.
Kahan.4 1 Judge Fuld could not discover
any gain in precision by re-enactment.
Comparing Section 484-h and Section
484-i of the Penal Law, Judge Fuld noted
that section 484-h (1) (F) incorporated
a number of provisions designed to pre-
vent unconstitutional application of the
law, which are not found in section 484-i.
Concluding that 484-i does not enable
vendors to know with any reasonable
degree of certainty exactly what material
is condemned, Judge Fuld found the stat-
ute to be unconstitutionally vague.
Among the safeguards of section 484-h
absent from section 484-i is the require-
ment of scienter of the bookseller as to
the age of the purchaser.42  By this
provision, one who makes an honest mis-
take as to the purchaser's age has a com-
plete defense to a prosecution under
section 484-h; under scction 484-i he is
strictly liable.
Taking the point of view opposite
to the majority's viewpoint on the issue,
the dissent thought the reason for re-
quiring scienter of content was equally
valid for holding scienter as to age a
constitutional requirement of any crim-
inal obscenity statute. Unlike the ma-
jority, the dissent intimated that it be-
lieved that instances of sale to persons
questionably over eighteen would be large
41 15 N.Y.2d 311, 206 N.E.2d 333, 258 N.Y.S.
2d 391 (1965) (per curiam). It is to be
noted that the opinion of the Court in Kahan,
regardless of Judge Fuld's supposition, criticized
no specific language, but only found "definitional
defects" in the statute.
42 N.Y. PEN. LAW § 484-h(1) (g) (ii).
enough to severely restrict distribution of
material to adults, particularly in the
case of young women. Judge Fuld con-
cluded that in its efforts to protect chil-
dren, the state has infringed upon the
first amendment by hindering the free
flow of information and ideas. In answer
to the argument that, if scienter as to
age is a constitutional requirement it
should be read into the statute, Judge
Fuld noted that the language of section
484-i is manifestly too explicit and specific
to permit such a construction.
Judge Bergan, also dissenting, concurred
in the views expressed by Judge Fuld. In
addition, he attacked the statute on prag-
matic grounds. It was thought that where
the prosecution had a choice between a
constitutionally sound statute (section 484-
h) and a defective statute (section 484-i)
the prosecution should rest on the sound
statute.13 To do otherwise would, it was
thought, create unnecessary litigation in
the federal courts, and leave the ultimate
decision on constitutionality in doubt.
In considering this statute in terms of
its constitutionality and the protection af-
forded the minor, one must take cogni-
zance of the conditions extant in society
today. Many communities have exper-
ienced a growing concern over the moral
degeneration of the minor. It has been
suggested that an apparent connection ex-
ists between this degeneration and the
minor's reading of obscene material.44
In order to allay the fears of their citizens
many states have enacted legislation re-
stricting the distribution of obscene ma-
4 3 Supra note 31, at 281, 220 N.E.2d at 792,
274 N.Y.S.2d at 143 (dissenting opinion).
44Fagan, supra note 38, at 274-78.
terials to minors.45  Section 484-h and
Section 484-i of the Penal Law are the
most recent efforts by New York to re-
strict the dissemination of pornographic
materials to minors. It is to be noted
that section 484-h, which is applicable
to minors under the age of seventeen, as
opposed to section 484-i, which applies to
minors under eighteen, requires scienter
of age before criminal prosecution. Sec-
tion 484-i fails to include such a require-
ment. The legislature, in specifically omit-
ting a requirement of scienter as to age
in section 484-i, enacted a statute which,
while apparently satisfying constitutional
standards, permeates the area with max-
imum regulation. In this regard, the
legislature has implicitly recognized the
45 Cf. Fagan, supra note 38.
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necessity for effectively protecting the
youth of New York from obscene ma-
terial.
This is an area of great controversy.
In the instant case, it appears that de-
fendant Tannenbaum's violation of sec-
tion 484-i resulted from a campaign con-
ducted by Operation Yorkville, purposive-
ly to test the statute's constitutionality.
The New York Court of Appeals has sus-
tained the constitutionality of section 484-
i. Nevertheless, the sharp dissent voiced
by Judge Fuld indicates the divergence
of opinion on this subject. It is probable
that the decision of the Court of Appeals
will not be allowed to stand unchallenged.
It is quite likely that the issue will find
its way to the Supreme Court for final
determination of its constitutionality.
p
